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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of  Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary7 interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
Abstract 
This paper devises three formal tlnodels of 'learning in informal networks' to study the 
long term implications of word-of-rnouth cornrnunications for the diffusion of contraceptive 
knowledge. The rnodels differ in the information that is shared among network partners, 
and with respect to the sophistication of women's decision rules. The theoretical properties 
of these models are compared with errlpirical evidence based on the 1973 Korean survey 
on women's social networks and contraceptive choices. The analysis proposes a qualitative 
choice rule that  models women's contraceptive decisions as an econometrician's problem 
to infer the differential quality of contraceptives from informal conversations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
Learning in informal social networks constitutes an important factor in the dispersion of 
new ideas and in the promotion of social change. In the analysis of the demographic tran- 
sition, this process has received particular attention: The diffusion of knowledge about 
modern contraception contributes to the rapid pace and the high pervasiveness of fertility 
declines (Cleland, 1987), and it gives rise to persisting geographic, ethnic and cultural dif- 
ferences in demographic practices (Watkins, 1990). An important propagation mechanism 
for the diffusion of fertility control are communications among kin, friends and community 
members. These conversations are primary channels for the transmission of contraceptive 
information in many pre-transitional societies, and they often augment knowledge indi- 
viduals receive from media, official sources or family planning representatives. 
A formalization of social learning about fertility control requires an investigation of 
the idiosyncrasies of communication in informal networks. This paper argues that  this 
formalization needs to include (a) limited exchange of individuals' characteristics during 
conversations that  results in unobserved heterogeneity; (b) communications that focus on 
technological choices instead of utility levels; and (c) decision rules that  combine knowl- 
edge obtained through social networks with private information. Although several models 
of word-of-mouth comlnunication and social learning have recently been developed (Elli- 
son and Fudenberg, 1993 and 1994; Arthur and Lane, 1993; Dosi and Kaniovski, 1994; 
McFadden and Train, 1995), these characteristics of informal conversations in heteroge- 
neous populations remain largely unaddressed. This analysis shows, however, that these 
assumptions can significantly change the pervasiveness of illformation diffusion and the 
social optimality of long-term outcomes. 
This paper motivates the behavioral assulnptions underlying the diffusion process with 
an  analysis of word-of-mouth colnlnunication about fertility control in rural Korean vil- 
lages. The following section establishes the empirical regularity that  the probability of 
a randomly selected woman to adopt the pill approxilnately equals the number of pill- 
users among her friends. The third section introduces generalized urn process for the 
dynamic study of learning in inforlnal networks. The forth section proposes a qualitative 
choice decision rule that forlllalizes contraceptive choice as an econometrician's problem 
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to infer the differential quality of technologies from 'incomplete' communication.' This 
diffusion process is shown to be consistent with the micro-evidence on women's contra- 
ceptive choices, and with the macro-observations on contraceptive practices in Korean 
villages or in pre-transitional European regions. The implication of this qualitative choice 
model are compared with two alternative specifications. One simplifies the decision rule 
and neglects private information, and the other assumes 'complete' communications that 
reveal the actual utility level and the individual characteristics of the network partner?. 
The conclusions of this analysis extend beyond fertility control. They pertain to the 
general situation when a person's choice between technologies is influenced by word-of- 
mouth communication with unobserved heterogeneity. In the demographic context this 
analysis aids the understanding of fertility declines in developing countries and provides 
suggestions for the design of fairlily planning programs. 
2 Social Learning about Fertility Control 
The qualitative aspects of social networking about fertility control have been subject to 
many sociological and anthropological investigations, and a review of this literature is 
given for instance in Watkins (1995), Montgomery and Casterline (1994), or Montgomery 
and Chung (1993). It is evident from these studies that cominunication with other commu- 
nity members is an important factor in contraceptive decision making. Typically women 
state that they have learned about contraception by coinmunication with friends, kin or 
other community members. (Focus group) Interviews with woinen further show that these 
conversations alllong network partners are ' i n c ~ n i ~ l e t e ' : ~  The conversations do not reveal 
many personal characteristics that have determined an individual's choice, and they do not 
mention the utility level woinen derive froill a specific method. The woinen exchange pri- 
marily information about the type of contraceptive used, possibly along with a subjective 
evaluation of the method. Attitudes, physiological conditions, and other individual char- 
acteristics influencing contraceptive choices are not coiriprehensively exchanged. Learning 
about fertility control in iiiforlnal networks is therefore characterized by unobserved hetero- 
'For a psychological perspective on the approx i~nat io~~  of human decision processes via statistical meth- 
ods see for instance Ceci and Liker (1986) or Schaller (1984). 
2Examples for interviews with women, or co~n~nunications among women about contraception can be 
found in Watkins, Rutenberg ant1 Green (1995) or in 1<11otlel et al. (1987).  
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geneity among network partners, and limited information about a method's performance. 
The women's interpretation of this 'incomplete' information obtained through social net- 
works is primarily an empirical question. Ideally we would like to know the decision rule 
that determines a women's choice in the presence of social networking. In absence of 
this knowledge the following analysis provides an empirical conjecture based on the 1973 
Korean survey on women's social networks. 
Although word-of-mouth colnmunication in traditional societies plays an import9nt 
role in a woman's choice to adopt lnodern contraception, an individual's decision is also 
influenced by socio-economic changes that shape the demand and supply for fertility con- 
trol (Easterlin and Crimmins, 1985). To emphasize the role of communication and social 
learning, the empirical investigation in this paper is restricted to women's choice among 
modern contraceptive methods, conditional on the use of one of these methods. Because 
these women have chosen to implement effective contraception, this restriction controls 
(approximately) for the demand and supply factors that influence the decision to practice 
fertility control. 
The 1973 Korean survey includes 1037 married women residing in 25 rural Korean 
villages with about 30 to 50 women of reproductive age. The survey gives information 
about the extent and information-content of social networking about modern fertility con- 
trol. The former is reflected in the nulnber of neighbors about whose contraceptive use an 
individual is informed. The latter can be inferred from the distribution of these network 
partners among available ~ n e t h o d s . ~  For instance, the larger the proportion of pill users 
among friends and neighbors, the more information a women learned about the charac- 
teristics of the pill, and the less she learned about the features of other methods. The 
following analysis is based on 268 woinen in the survey who use modern methods (loop 
(IUD), pill, condom and vasectomy) and know a t  least one other colnl~lunity member who 
uses a   nod ern  neth hod.^ 86 of these woinen use the pill, 119 the loop (IUD), and 63 rely 
3The statements about friends' and neighbors' contraceptive metl~ods refer to the 'perceived' use by 
neighbors. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that knowledge or perceptions about other women's 
contraceptive use is derived from previous word-of-lnoutl~ co~nn~unication with these community members. 
The data do not provide inforlnation whether these perceptions about other women's contraceptive use are 
correct. However, Montgomery (1993) confirms earlier findings that perceptions of co~nmunity member's 
use are more i~nportant than their actual method of fertility colitrol. 
'This restriction on the users of   nod ern contraception does not bias the results if the decision to use 
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on condom or vasectomy for fertility control. The mean age is 21 years, 74% attended a t  
least elementary school, and they have on average 4.2 living children, 0.9 more than their 
desired fertility level. For siillplicity of notation the analysis refers to these 268 gsers of 
modern contraception as umc-women. Their potential sources of inforination about fer- 
- 
tility control, the users of modern contraception known to the decision maker, are called 
umc-fnends. 
Table 1 suminarizes the average number of contraceptive users among neighbors 3nd 
friends for all women and for umc-women in the survey. On average, individuals know 
about seven community members using iliodern contraception, and women using modern 
contraception themselves are noticeably better informed about the practice of other com- 
munity members. More importantly, the method used by a woinen herself also has the 
largest representation arnong her friends and neighbors. This observation is consistent 
with the hypothesis of inforination diffusion through word-of-mouth coillinunication when 
ego's choice is influenced by friends. There are, however, also contrary interpretations in 
which the knowledge about other community member's contraceptive use does not indi- 
cate social networking about fertility control. For instance, this is the case when a women 
using the pill is more likely to have friends who also use the pill because they meet at  
the same doctor. Table 1 and the subsequent empirical analysis cannot distinguish these 
conflicting explanations. Despite this ambiguity in the available survey data,  a causal 
interpretation of table 1 and the following econorrletric analysis in terms of information 
diffusion is suggested by other forrns of empirical data, such as the qualitative statements 
of women in focus group interviews. 
The following analysis coilcentrates on the decision to adopt the pill versus other means 
modern contraception does not select women with respect to their p r o p e ~ ~ s i t y  of using one of the four 
modern methods.  This  restriction is in particular consistent with a 2-stage decision process in which 
women first decide wl~e the r  to  use modern contraception, and in then determine the method in a second 
step. Forrnally this assumption reduces to  the requirements tha t  a multinomial choice model can be 
represented in a hierarchical decision tree (for a discussion see McFadden, 1984). T h e  primary reason for 
not modeling the  first s tage  abou t  the adoption of modern contraceptive is the limited availability of d a t a  
in the  Korean Survey for this estimation, and the 'similarity' of 111odern ~ ~ ~ e t , l ~ o d s  when they are  compared 
to  the  alternatives 'traditional methods  o r  no contraception'. T h e  r e q u i r e l r ~ e ~ ~ t  tha t  a umc-woman knows 
a t  least one UIIIC-friend drops  46 users of rnodern contraception t h a t  s t a t e  no knowledge about  o ther  
community me~nber s '  contraceptive use. T h e  contraceptive cl~oice of these wonre11 therefore cannot  be 
traced wit11 the available d a t a  to  social networking. 
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of modern contraception. Very silnilar conclusions are obtained for the choice of loop versus 
other modern methods. The analyses of condom and vasectomy are also consistent with 
the following results, but display a higher variance due to the small nulnber of relevant 
observations in the survey. In table 2 the women are grouped according to the proportion 
of pill users among umc-friends. The first column gives the groups with the respective 
means, and the second and third column give the number of women and the proportion of 
pill users in each group. The remaining colunins give the average number of umc-friends 
for pill-users and other users of lnodern contraceptives. 
A colnparison of colulnns 1 and 3 in table 2 elnphasizes the previous conjecture that 
a higher proportion of pill users among friends increases the probability of a woman to 
adopt the pill. Moreover, figure 1 shows a close relationship between the proportion of 
pill users among network partners, and the proportion of pill users in each of category. 
In most groups the proportion of pill users among umc-friends approxilnately equals the 
proportion of umc-women using the pill. Deviations from this pattern occur primarily 
in the first and last group where all network partners use an identical method. The 
claim that this pattern is due to social networking and not village specific effects (such 
as preferences of local family planning representatives) is supported a regression of the 
women's contraceptive use on personal characteristics and village dummies. Denote li 
the number of umc-friends of a women, and m the nulnber of pill users among umc- 
friends. Let x be a vector of socioecono~nic variables, including a constant, the women's 
age, the number of living children, excess fertility, and e d ~ c a t i o n . ~  A logistic regression 
of the variable 'women uses the pill' on the proportion of pill users among friends E, 
the socioeconomic characteristics x and village dulnlnies is reported in the first column of 
table 3. The estimated parameters show that the proportion of pill-users among friends 
contributes significantly to the probability of pill-use even when village dummies capture 
the average pill-prevalence on the village level and other comlnunity specific effects. 
The clustering of points around the 45 degree line in figure 1 suggests a statistical 
interpretation that specifies the effect of social networking on contraceptive decisions: the 
probability of a (randolllly selected) wolllan to choose the pill versus other lnodern methods 
"xcess fertility is the difference between a women's number of living cllildren and her stated level of 
desired fertility. Tlre education variable is all indicator variable that equals one if tile wornen attended at  
least elementary sc l~ool .  
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is approximately equal to the proportion of pill users ainong her network partners. This 
conjecture of Pr(u1nc-woman adopts pill IX, I i ,  m )  = is supported in a logistic regression 
that specifies a woman's contraceptive choice as a function of her socio-economic variables 
x, the network variables IC, m,  and other 'non-network' factors, as for instance media. 
The last factor is expressed as a probability a that a women 'changes her mind' from the 
choice suggested by her network and socio-economic variables (IC, m,  x )  to the alternative 
method. The existence of such 'non-network7 influences is apparent in the first (la$) 
group of table 2 where women adopt the pill (loop) without knowing any person who uses 
this method; in these cases the woman's decision cannot be attributed to word of mouth 
comm~nica t ion .~  An inspection of columns 4 and 5 in table 2 shows that  the women have 
a distinctly smaller network of urnc-friends. This observation suggests that the influence 
of non-network inforillation decreases with the extent of word-of-mouth cornmunication. 
Network and non-network influences together then yield the probability of a woman to 
adopt the pill versus other modern contraceptives in the form7 
Pr(umc-woman uses pilllX, K ,  m )  = (1 - a)p,,, + a ( 1  - p,,,). (1) 
p,, = [I + erh*f2B]-1 . erlll*+zB is a standard logit formulation for the probability 
that a woman adopts the pill based on (x, I i , m ) .  The probability p,, reduces to the 
conjectured relation p,,, = F if (y7/?) = (1,O). The probability a that 'non-network' 
information leads to a 'change of mind' is specified as a = e"0+"lK. The maximum 
likelihood estimation results for equation 1 are given in the secontl colurnn of table 3. They 
indicate that the socio-economic characteristics of women do not significantly influence 
the contraceptive choice among modern methods once the social network is included. 
Furthermore, a Wald test for the null-hypothesis that (y,  j3) = (1,O) yields a X2 distributed 
test statistic of 1.044 (p = 0.984). The parameter restriction is not rejected, and hence 
the conjecture that  p,, = F is supported by the Korean data. The coefficients for a 
indicate that the influence of non-network information is relatively weak. The average 
nurnber of uinc-friends for wornen in this sample is slightly inore than 10 and hence the 
probability that a wornan 'changes her mind' on the basis of non-network inforrnation is 
6 0 f  course, there may be 'second-hand' information that is trans~nitted through social networks. In 
tlre absence of ally data to investigate tliis aspect lllese decisio~ls that 'contradict' the co~nposition of a 
woman's social network are attributed to non-network inforrnation. 
'This rnodel is a n~odification of tlle error in binary response rnodel tliscussed in Cox and Snell (1989).  
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0.06; this probability increases to 0.20 for women with only three umc-friends and explains 
the observed adoption of pill (loop) even in absence of umc-friends using the this method. 
Tlie analysis indicates that  women evaluate network-information in combination with 
their private knowledge about personal characteristics. The more popular the pill is among 
her friends, the more effective the pill is perceived by the decision maker, and the more 
likely she will adopt the pill. If women ignored their private information, they would 
follow the majority of their friends in order to choose the optimal contraceptive method. 
This behavior is not consistent with empirical observation that suggests a pattern in the 
form p,, = z. The gradual increase in a woman's probability to adopt the pill as the 
proportion of pill-users among her friends increases suggests a decision rule that  evaluates 
the information obtained from other wornen with private knowledge such as preferences, 
religious attitudes or medical reason. 
The next section introduces generalized urn processes to study the implications of 
social learning for the diffusion of contraceptive practices over time. The analysis then 
derives a decision rule that  motivates and rationalizes above empirical observations. The 
following discussion is framed in terms of a woman's choice between a modern method and 
a traditional method of contraception. It should be understood that the terms 'modern' 
and 'traditional' can be replaced by any other contraceptive or technological alternatives, 
as long as the importance of word-of-mouth comi~lunication on individuals' choices is 
maintained. 
3 A Simple Model of Diffusion 
Imagine that there are two possible contraceptives, a lllodern method M ,  and a traditional 
method T. Wolnen choose the contraceptive that offers the higher utility. The population 
is assumed to be homogeneous with respect to observable characteristics, but there is an 
individual-specific deviation from the average that is know to the women but not gener- 
ally observable. Moreover, the woman's knowledge about her individnal characteristics 
is imperfect, and hence there is an unanticipated 'surprise' coinponent that  the woman 
learns only after adopting one of the two methods. 
The woman's utility fro111 using a contraceptive nlethod is given by 
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This utility is decolnposed into the average utility p;, the individual specific component 
known to the woman c;, and the unanticipated random effect v;. Assume that  (cM, cT) 
has a joint normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix C. Let v;, i = M, T 
be i.i.d. norlnals with mean zero, variance ;a2 and independent of (EM, cT). Since the 
woman's decision depends only on the difference in utility levels we can write 
where p = p~ - p ~ ,  c = - CT and v = v~ - v ~ .  
The parameter p expresses the average utility difference women derive from M and T .  
It can also be interpreted as the (average) differential effectiveness of the two methods. c 
reflects women's religious, attitudinal or physiological differences with respect to contra- 
ceptive use. Without loss of generality we can specify < - N(0, l ) .  Since v is unknown to 
the decision maker, a woinan chooses M if E[AU I c]  = p + c > 0 and T otherwise. 
In traditional societies it is reasonable to assume that women do not use contraception 
early in their marriages. The incentive to implement contraceptive techniques arises once 
a women achieves her desired family size (see for instance Easterlin and Crimmins, 1985). 
She then chooses between two available techniques: the traditional method T ,  or the 
modern method M ,  both of which are available a t  zero monetary costs.g The utility of 
these methods differs from person to person. These differences are reflected in the average 
utility difference p ,  and the individual specific utility difference c+v in equation 2. Women 
are aware of their individual characteristics c, but neither know the surprise component v 
nor recognize the individual characteristics of their network partners. 
If p is publicly known, a randoiiily selected wolilan reaching her desired family size 
chooses contraceptive M with probability P r (p  + c >_ 0) = @(p).  Because v is i.i.d. 
across individuals and c is a known individual-specific deviation there is no incentive for 
'The normality assumptions for t i ,  ui ,  i = M, T are strictly for convenience of notation and innocuous 
for the results of this paper. All the res~ilts can be establisl~ed wit11 ally other mean zero, well behaved 
distribution. 
'The zero ~nonetary cost ass11111ptio11 e l i ~ n i ~ ~ a t e s  he ueed to c o ~ ~ s i d e r  budget considerations. A extension 
to include sn~al l  cost differentials follows ~~atural ly  by i~~troducing a decision thresholtl that is different froin 
zero in the cl~oice rule 'choose hf if E[AU I c ]  = p + c 2 0 and T otherwise'. Significant rno~~etary costs 
require the explicit ~notleling of the budget co~~straint  and are not p u r s ~ ~ e d  here. 
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a woman to gather additional information. In the long ten11 the proportion of M-users in 
the contracepting population converges to + ( / L ) .  Because a priori the individuals' decisions 
cannot be improved unless we impose knowledge of v, this convergence for the proportion 
of M-users to @(p) is the optimal or socially eficient outcome. 
The more interesting case pertains to the situation when women do not know the 
differential effectiveness /L of the available methods M and T. Because there is no pub- 
lic information about fertility control, women base contraceptive decisions only on their 
1 
private information e ,  in combination with the advice obtained from other community 
members. We assume that the infor~nal interactions anlong co~nmunity nlelnbers take the 
form of random sampling: the decision maker randomly selects li current contraceptive 
users (i.e., women using either M or T) ,  and asks then1 about their method of fertility 
control. Based on these responses and her private knowledge she decides on one of the 
two alternatives. After making her choice for either nlethod M or T, the woman adds 
herself to the contracepting population and becomes a potential information source for 
future decision makers. 
This analysis devises three behavioral rules that determine the contraceptive choice 
given a specific sample outcome. These rules differ in two dimensions: (a)  in information 
content of conversations among network members, and (b) in the sophistication of indi- 
viduals' decision rules. All of the following models assunle a heterogeneous population as 
specified in equation 2. Initially the paper considers nlodels in which comnlunication does 
not completely reveal the heterogeneity among network partners. The first decision rule is 
a majority model in which women will adopt the most popular choice in their samples with 
probability a ,  and opt for the nlinority response with probability 1 - a. In the following 
qualitative choice models women make statistical inferences from their sanlples, and decide 
based on the estimated differential effectiveness of the two methods. In this decision rule, 
women opti~nally utilize private knowledge ant1 the 'limited' information learnt from other 
co~n~nuni ty  members. The final analysis contrasts the inlplications of the previous mod- 
els, that are based on 'limited' communication alllong network partners, with a revealed 
utility model that assumes 'complete' co~n~nunications about utility levels and individual 
characteristics. 
The unifying fornlal framework for these diffusion niodels is a generalized Polya urn 
scheme. 'Time' is ~neasuretl in number of wonlen reaching their desired fanlily size and 
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making contraceptive decisions. The following notation and structure is common to all 
parts of the analysis. Denote 
X, : proportion of women in the contracepting population using method M 
a t  time n. 
1 - X n :  proportion of women in the contracepting population using method T a t  
time n. I 
B, : random variable that  equals one if I L  + 1"' woman adopts contraceptive 
M ,  and equals zero otherwise. 
p(Ii ,  m ,  E): probability that a woman with individual-specific characteristic E chooses 
M ,  given a sample of size Ii containing m users of contraceptive M .  
( I ,  m): probability that a randomly selected woman chooses M ,  given a sam- 
ple of size I( containing m users of contraceptive M ;  note p(Ii ,  m )  = 
E[p(Ii,  rn, E)]. 
The function p(I i ,  nz, E) captures the woman's decision process: it gives the conditional 
probability of choosing contraceptive M ,  given her individual characteristic E and a sample 
of size K containing rn users of  neth hod M .  Assu~ne that there are initially yo contraceptive 
users, and that women reach their desired fanlily size randomly with respect to E. When the 
n+ 1'' woman engages in word-of-mouth conl~tlunication she samples without replacement 
from a pool of y,, = yo + n contracepting woman of whom X, = x, are using method M .  
The probability that  the TL + lSt woman will chose M, given X,, = x,,, is given by 
) = Pr(Bl1+1 = 1 I X,, = x,,) 
The last term in equation 3 specifies the probability that a rando~nly selected woman 
chooses M ,  given that her social networking yields a sanlple of Ii informants containing 
i users of the modern methotl. Taking rxpectations with respect to all possible sample 
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outcomes gives the probability of a randomly chosen women to adopt method M. The 
hypergeometric distribution in above expression can be written as 
1 x, , (x, ,  - -)-( x,, - e ) ( l - ~ , l ) ( l - ~ n  - L ) . . . ( ~ -  A'-i-1 
( I ? )  
m m m X ~ I  - ?) 
m 
where bXK(7, , ,  x , )  5 Vx,  E [o ,  11 and some constant c x K .  Because P ( K ,  m) is 
bounded and independent of n equation 3 simplifies to 
with S U ~ , ~ [ ~ , ~ ]  bK(7 , , , x )  5 for some constant c K ,  
The dynalnics of contraceptive prevalence in the population are determined by the 
evolution of X,, ,  the proportion of contracepting woman using method M. Let the process 
begin with initially yo contraceptive users of whom a proportion X o  elnploys method M. 
Recursive calculation of X,,  yields following stochastic process: 
1 1 
= X,, + - (X,I - qn(X,1)) + - (B,1+1 - q, , (X, , ) ) .  
70 + 1L 70 + 7L ( 6 )  
The process { X , , }  is a generalized urn scheine studied in Arthur et al. (1986) ,  Hill et al. 
(1980) and Dosi et al. (1994) .  Because q,,(x) converges to q ( x )  a t  a rate faster than IL, 
it follows from theorem 3.1 in Arthur et al. (1987) that X,,  itself converges almost surely 
on the set of fix points of the urn function q ( x ) .  For the one-dimensional case where 
X ,  is a rand0111 variable denote a fix point x* an upcrossing if q(x* )  > 1 ,  and call x* a 
downcrossing if q(x* )  < 1 .  The possible linlits for X,,  are the intersectiolls of q ( x )  with the 
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45 degree line. Moreover, theorem 6.3 in Arthur et al. rules out upcrossings as possible 
limits. 
The analysis of inforination diffusion on the basis of generalized urn schemes starts 
with a specification of the decision rules that determine p(I<, m ,  e), the probability that 
a woman with individual characteristic e chooses method M on the basis of social net- 
working with I< contraceptive users, of whom m implement method M. On the basis 
of this decision rule the urn function q(x) is calculated by p(I<, m )  = Ep(K, m, e) apd 
inserting into equation 5. The dynamic implications of word-of-mouth communication on 
the contraceptive prevalence follow because asyinptotically the proportion of M users in 
the contracepting population, X,,, will converge to one of the fix points {x I q(x) = x). 
Although this is a limiting argument on the basis that n + oo, finite time distributions 
for X, can be obtained by recursively evaluating the urn function q,(z). The examples 
given later show that the process converges relatively fast, and that after 60-80 contra- 
ceptive decisions the contraceptive prevalence XI, is already well described by the limiting 
behavior. 
The simplest decision rule for contraceptive choice on the basis of word-of-mouth com- 
munication is a majority rule that  ignores the individual-specific information e: a woman 
makes her contraceptive choice only dependent on the behavior of the majority in her 
sample. In particular, we specify that a woinan adopts the method of the majority with 
probability a, and chooses the alternative inethocl with probability 1 - a. To rule out 
ties we let the sainple size I(- be odd. Froin this majority based decision rule, we can now 
write 
Inserting this expression in equation 4 yields after soine algebra 
q(x) = Pr(BIItI  = 1 I XI, = x,,) = 1 - a + ( 2 a -  l )b(I i ,x) ,  
where b(Ii, x )  = 5 ( ) x;,(l - x , , ) ~ - ~ .  
Let P ( I i , x )  = S b ( I i ,  x). Depending on the paraiueters cr and Ii we can distinguish 
the following cases, that  are depicted in figure 2: (a) I{ > 1 , a  = 0.5: q(x) = 0.5Vx and 
has single downcrossing at  x = 0.5; (b )  Ii = 1,O 5 a < 1: q(z) is a straight line with 
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slope (2a  - 1)  and has a single downcrossing a t  x = 0.5; (c) I< = 1, a = 1: q(x) = x, and 
all x E [ O , 1 ]  are possible limit points; (d) I< = 1, a = 0: q(x) = 1 - x, and has a single 
downcrossing a t  x = 0.5; (e) I< > 1, a < P(I<,0.5): q(x) has a single downcrossing a t  
x = 0.5; (f)  I< > 1, a > P(I<, 0.5): q(x) has 3 fixed points: one downcrossing a t  x = 0.5, 
and two upcrossings a t  xO(a)  and x l ( a )  (note: for a = 1 : xo( l )  = 0 and x l ( l )  = 1). 
In cases (a) ,  (b), (d), and (e) the proportion of M-users in the population will even- 
tually converge to 0.5, independent of the of the actual utility obtained with the methqds 
M or T. In all these cases, a is relatively small, and hence the influence of the majority's 
choice is not strong enough to induce increasing returns into the decision making process. 
The evolution of the X,, is not path dependent, and the initial proportion of M-users has 
no impact on the limiting distribution. 
If women are uncertain about the contraceptive effectiveness, it is plausible that deci- 
sion makers tend to follow the majority with a high probability. The information diffusion 
process with a close to one equals case (f)  above, and q(x) has three fixed points as shown 
in figure 2. The downcrossing is not attained as a possible limit of X,, and we conclude 
that one of the two methods M or T will eventually dominate in the contracepting pop- 
ulation. Independent of the initial proportion of M-users both outcomes have a positive 
probability. This model exhibits a 'snowball-effect' due to information diffusion: If ini- 
tial choices increase the proportion of M-users, subsequent decision maker have a higher 
probability of finding a majority of M-users in their samples. Hence, they tend to fol- 
low the initial adopter's choice, and in the long term only one method will prevail in the 
contracepting population. 
This convergence towards the dominance of one nlethod is relatively fast. Assume for 
instance the following example: A family planning representative contacts 10 women in 
a village and informs then1 objectively about the two methods of fertility control. The 
women learn in this conversation that the (average) differential effectiveness between the 
two methods is p = 0.253. Suppose exactly the expected number 10 a(0.253) = 6 choose 
method M." In above for~nal  framework this implies that  yo = 10 and Xo = 0.6. If 
further contraceptive use in this village is determined by word-of-mouth colll~llunication 
'OTliis o u t c o ~ ~ i e  s motivated by tlie idea that tlie FP representative cannot select women with respect 
to the unobservable characteristic c ,  and he can also not coerce wornen to use M if it were not the optimal 
choice with p + c > 0. 
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with a majority rule ( a  = I ) ,  one of the two lnethods will become a dominant method of 
fertility control. The first two columns of table 4 indicate the speed of this convergence: 
already after 40 women have made their contraceptive choices, the probability that method 
T or M is used by more than 80% is 0.015 and 0.89 respectively. 
The primary theoretical criticism against this majority model is the lack of micro- 
economic foundations in the decision rules. It is not at  all clear why persons in a heteroge- 
neous population ought to follow the majorities choice with a pre-determined probabivty 
a. The primary empirical criticism refers to the model's inconsistency with observed de- 
mographic patterns: The majority rule is not consistent with figure 1, indicating a linear 
increase in the probability to adopt the pill as the proportion of pill users among friends 
rises. Moreover, the model does not predict the variety of demographic patterns observed 
by Watkins' (1990) in pre-transitional Europe, or the non-uniformity of pill use in the 
Korean villages shown in figure 3: in all cases with Ii > 1 above model predicts either 
convergence between regions, or a polarization between two possible outcomes. 
4 Qualitative Response Models 
A modification of the individuals' decision rules reconciles the dynamics of the diffu- 
sion process with the empirical observation in pre-transitional Europe and Korea. This 
section establishes explicit micro-foundations for contraceptive decisions based on social 
networking, and increases the information women infer from their respective samples. 
Contraceptive choice in this model is motivated by rational behavior when word-of-mouth 
communication is characterized by limited information transmission and unobserved het- 
erogeneity. Individuals 'optimally' interpret the partial information they learn through 
conversations with other community members, and form contraceptive choices by cornbin- 
ing private information with the advice of friends and neighbors. 
In particular, this section restricts conversations among wolllen to current contracep- 
tive use and a limited amount of socio-economic infornation. The nlodel then assumes 
that women approach the problem of contraceptive choice like an econometrician, who 
tries to infer the true parameters from a salnple population. The econolnetrician's sample 
corresponds to the inforination obtained by social networking, ant1 the estimation prob- 
lem corresponds to the inference of p,  the differential effectiveness of nlethods M and T. 
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The woman's contraceptive choice is based on the estiinated parameter @ and her private 
information E .  Of course, this analysis does not imply that women actually form and max- 
imize likelihood equations when making contraceptive decisions. However, this section 
argues that  the empirical patterns in the Korean data, and the variation of contraceptive 
prevalence in communities can be understood and rationalized on the basis of this decision 
model. 
The first subsection focuses on a situation with no observable heterogeneity arnqng 
individuals. Women's contraceptive decisions depend only on private information, such as 
personal preferences and attitudes, and on the number of M and T users among friends 
and neighbors. The subsequent subsection confir~ns that the main conclusions also hold 
with observable differences in the population, such as religion or race. 
4.1 N o  observable heterogeneity in the population 
When women base their contraceptive decision on word-of-mouth comnlunication they 
assume that  the answers reflect the true differential effectiveness IL of the methods: They 
expect the objectively superior inethod to dominate in their respective social networks. 
Since a person only interacts with a randomly selected subset of the population, women 
believe that  the data-generating process underlying the sample is given by equation 2 
combined with the decision rule 'choose M if E[AU ( €1 = p + c 2 0 and T otherwise'. If 
they were not convinced of this fact, asking other community members about their con- 
traceptive choices would not be a sensible procedure to gather information about p.  It is 
important to understand that these beliefs are not objectively true in a process of sequen- 
tial decisions. Because each decision maker sarrlples previous users and adds herself to the 
pool of users after her decision, the contracepting population becomes 'contaminated' with 
women who made wrong decisions due to sa~npling variation. The effect of these wrong 
decisions prevails because they change the distribution of future sampling outcomes. At 
any time n the proportion of M-users does not necessarily reflect the true data-generating 
process with parameter p,  but results from path-dependent sequential decisions. The 
analysis in this section assumes that individuals are only boundedly rational: they are not 
aware of this implication of sequential decisions. Given these beliefs, a decision rule that  
replicates the estimation of a qualitative choice illode1 is the optiinal behavior of women 
because they infer the iuaximal iilfor~llatio~i froin ally give11 sample. 
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The specification of utility in equation 2 implies that a woman who knows her indi- 
vidual E will choose M if E[AU I E ]  = p + E > 0. If p is unknown the decision maker 
replaces p by an estimate ji inferred from word-of-mouth communication. The estimation 
of ji from a sample of binary variables indicating the contraceptive use of network partners 
is a standard application of qualitative choice models. Given a sample of size I< with m 
respondents using methods M ,  ji is the maxiinizer of the log-likelihood function 
L(p;  I<, 7n) = mlog @(p)  + (I< - m) log @(-p). 
In this simple case with no observable heterogeneity, ji = @-'(E), where @-' is the 
inverse of the cunlulative normal distribution function." The woman chooses method M 
if ji + E >_ 0, and method T otherwise. 
The dynamics of the X,, the prevalence of modern contraception, follow from equa- 
tion 6 after the probability p (K,  m)  that a randomly selected woman will choose M ,  given 
a sample of size I< with m respondents using method M ,  is established. Observe 
That is, the probability of the PL + lSt woman choosing method M equals the proportion 
of M-users she observes in her sample drawn froin the yo + n woinen currently using 
method M or T. Intuitively, in binary qualitative choice models the average predicted 
probability of using M has to equal the proportion of M-users in the sample. With no 
observable heterogeneity this reduces to the requirement that  ji predicts the observed 
sample frequency. 
The theoretical finding of equation 8 is consistent with the empirical observation in 
figure 1: I t  implies that the probability of a (randomly selected) woman to choose method 
"Notes: ( a )  Tlris property lrolds for s i ~ r ~ p l e  qualitative choice models and is independent of the normality 
assumption which is used primarily for analytic convenience. I t  is easily derived by taking the  first order 
conditions of the likelihood function. Th i s  argument requires, however, t ha t  women know the  distribution 
of c ,  or tlre 'anrount of heterogeneity' in the  populatioir. This  a s s u ~ r ~ p t i o n  is supported by psychological 
surveys tha t  indicate individuals' knowledge about  tlre distribution of certain traits  in a population; see 
for instance H o l l a ~ ~ d  e t al. (1986) for a discussion. (b )  This  qualitative cl~oice model is not defined if the 
sample contains only users of a single n~et l rod.  Th i s  i~rdeternrinacy is resolved by assuming tha t  a woman 
decides for tlre only ~netlrotl t ha t  is contained in lrer sample. Tlrat  is, if a sample of size 5 revealed only 
'T-users, tlre wolrralr will also clroose T i ~ r d e p e ~ r d e ~ l t  of her c.  
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M equals the proportion of M-users in her sample. It therefore predicts the observation of 
table 2 that in each group the proportion of pill users among umc-women equals the average 
proportion of pill-users among umc-friends. This finding also shows that an increase in 
the network size, holding constant, has no effect on the probability to adopt M. 
Given expression 8 we can calculate the urn function q ( x )  for the qualitative choice 
This urn function q ( x )  equals the 45 degree line, and hence all points on [O, I.] are fix 
points and possible limit points for the generalized urn process X,,. Equation 9 reveals the 
main insight of this section: Assume women have the boundedly rational beliefs mentioned 
a t  the beginning of this section, and sequentially salllple the pool of M and T users by 
word-of-mouth communication. If they make their contraceptive decisions according to 
above qualitative choice rule, the proportion of M-users in the contracepting population 
converges to a fixed proportion X ,  and the distribution of this limiting proportion X has 
continuous support on [ O , l ] .  
The continuation of above numerical exalllple lllakes this finding clearer. Assume 
again that a family planning representative has consulted 10 women in a village about 
fertility control, and that  for p = 0.253 the expected number 6 have adopted method 
M. Word-of-mouth communication with qualitative choice decision rules determines the 
contraceptive choices for the all other women in the community. Figure 4 shows the 
probability distribution for X,, after 10 to 200 women have made contraceptive choices. 
The distribution starts with a peak a t  the initial value. Then the distribution of X, 
becomes more dispersed, indicating the uncertain effects of word-of-co~nmunication on the 
diffusion of contraceptive knowledge. Depending on the decisions of the first adopters, 
social learning may either increase the prevalence of ~llethotl M ,  or result in a larger usage 
of the traditional method T. Yet, a dominance by nlethod M or T is relatively unlikely. 
Table 4 shows that after 80 women have nlade contraceptive decisions, the probability of 
method T or M being used by Illore than 80% of the contracepting population is only 
0.0015 and 0.064 respectively. In contrast to the nlajority rule, the distribution of X, 
12To see why the second equality below holds, n~ultiply boll, sides by I< aud observe that the resulting 
relation is the mean of a binomial distribution. 
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approaches a bell-shaped form with considerable variation. This qualitative choice model 
implies a long-term coexistence of both methods within the same village, and it predicts 
a regional diversity of contraceptive practices among villages. 
A slight simplification allows us to establish the liiniting distribution of X, analytically. 
So far the analysis has assumed that the sampling of community members is without 
replacement, yielding the hypergeometric distribution in equation 3. If the initial number 
of contraceptive users yo is large compared to the sample size K ,  then the differeqce 
between sampling without replacement and with replacement is minor.13 If the sampling 
in word-of-mouth coinmunication is with replacement, the term bK(y,,, x,) in equation 4 
disappears, the urn function reduces to q,,(x) = q(x) = x, and X, follows a Polya urn 
process.14 This holds independent of the size K of social networks. The random limit 
X of the proportion of M-users in the contracepting population has a beta distribution 
depending only on the initial number of contraceptive users yo, and the initial proportion 
of M-users, Xo. In above exainple with yo = 10 and X o  = 0.6 the liiniting density 
function for X,, is given in figure 5. Despite the fact that the initial composition reflected 
the 'socially optimal' outcome under knowledge of p, the limit of the information diffusion 
process can deviate significantly. The 25% and 75% percentiles of the distribution in 
figure 5 are 0.55 and 0.71 respectively. The degree of deviation does not depend on the 
effort that woinen put into gathering information: the limiting distribution is independent 
of the network size Ii. In particular this limiting distribution is also achieved if the sample 
size Ii is a randoin variable; a sufficient condition for this assertion to hold is independence 
of K from the individual characteristic 6 .  That is, if a woman's effort to gather information 
is random, but independent of her private information, the beta-distribution continues to 
characterize the long-term consequences of word-of-mouth communication. 
These properties are consistent with Watkins' observation of regional diversity in de- 
mographic practices in pre-transitional Europe, or in rural Korea. In above diffusion 
model, regions starting with an identical (not too large) 'base' of contraceptive users can 
converge to a variety of different outcomes; there is no polarization as in the case of the 
majority rule. The Korean pattern exhibited in figure 3 with a wide variety of demo- 
13A common rule of tlrumb for tlre approxi~nation of tbe hypergeolrretric distribution by the binomial 
distribution is 20 . li 5 yo. 
"See for ilrstallce Feller (1971)  for a proof of this proposition. 
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graphic practices prevailing in separated village populations is typical for the information 
diffusion process in this section. 
This analysis further indicates that information diffusion through 'limited' communi- 
cation among community members is a relatively inefficient way of learning, even though 
women optimally infer the information contained in their samples. This argument also 
suggests that a family planning program should not focus on improving the diffusion chan- 
nels, i.e., increasing the sample size to which each woman uses in her decision process. 
Instead it has to focus in establishing a large initial base of M-users which are the basis 
for subsequent saillples. Figure 5 also shows the beta limiting-tlistribution for yo = 100 
instead of 10 in the previous example. In this case the limiting distribution is much more 
concentrated around the optinlal outcoine of 0.6. To assure that information diffusion 
leads to an outcoine that  is close to this optimal value, the family planning program has 
to establish a large base initial users. 
4.2 Observable heterogeneity in the population 
This section verifies that the conclusion established above holds even if there is observable 
heterogeneity within the population. We assuine that the population is divided into two 
groups j = 0 , l  according to some observable characteristic z, say religion. The utility 
of the contraceptive methods M and T cliffers for the members of this subgroups. A 
randomly selected woinen belongs to group zero with probability 1 - y, and to group one 
with probability y. Hence, z is a random variable taking zero for members of group 0, and 
one for members of group 1. Maintaining all relevant assumptions of the previous section 
we can write 
AU = p + p z + c + v .  ( l o )  
If we assume that there is no co~n~llunications across the two groups and each woman 
samples only members of her own group, then the contraceptive prevalence in each group 
evolves independently according to the previous analysis. The interesting case therefore 
concerns the situation when women observe the choices of ineinbers in both groups and 
also know to which group each mernber of the sample belongs. For siirlplicity we snppose 
that sampling is randoin across both groups (for instance, a woinan learns about the 
characteristic only during the conversation and does not know it a priori). A woman 
cleciding about fertility control draws a sample of size K froill the contraccpting population 
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with the following composition: I[, members of the sample belong to group j, and m j  
respondents of group K j  are using method M .  She then chooses p and P to maximize the 
likelihood function15 
The dynamics of contraceptive prevalence in each of the four groups can be modeled 
with a 4-color urn reflecting each of the four possible combinations between contraceptive 
M or T, and group 0 or 1. Yet, since the distribution of women between the groups 
j = 0 , l  is exogenously given, the long-term properties of X n j ,  j = 0 , l  can be established 
using the familiar one-dimensional process. Denote y,, the proportion of group j in the 
contracepting population, and let X , , j  be tlie proportion of the contracepting popula- 
tion belonging to  group j, j = 1 , 2  who uses contraceptive M at  time n. Furthermore 
use p(Ko, K1, mo, m1,z) for the probability that  a randomly chosen woman belonging to 
group z will adopt M ,  given that  a sample of size + Ii2 contains m j  users of contra- 
ceptive M belonging to  group j, j = 0 , l .  Similar to the previous analysis we enumerate 
all possible sample compositions, and calculate the probability that  a randomly selected 
woman of group j chooses method M based on each sample composition. Taking first 
order conditions for the likelihood function yields that fi  = @-'(2)) and = @ - ' ( 2 ) .  
The probability of a randomly selected worilan of group j to adopt M ,  given the outcome 
of word-of-mouth communication, tlien follows as 
which is similar to  the previous section: The probability of a randomly selected group-j- 
woman to  choose M equals the proportion of M users among the group-j-women in her 
sample. From the large law of numbers it follows that y,, --+ y. Some more algebra reveals 
that  the probability of a randomly selected women of group one choosing method M is 
15 Again, the parameters in the likelihood fu~~ct ion  are not defined if the san~ple does not contain at least 
one member of each of the four possible co~nbi~~at ions  between co~~traceptive and group. This indeterminacy 
is resolved by assuming that a W O I I I ~ I I  chooses 111et11od M (or T )  in these cases with probability equal the 
proportion of M (or T )  users i11 the sample belongiug to her group. 
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given by 
Pr(  randomly selected woman of group j 
will adopt method M I x , , ~ ,  z,,l, y,) 
An equivalent relation holds for members of group zero. The first part of above equa- 
tion gives the probability of finding k women of one's own group in a sample of size 
K. The remainder of above equation decomposes k into M and T users and multiplies 
each sample outcome with the predicted probability of adopting M .  We see from this 
expression that the probability of a randomly selected woman of group j adopting M only 
depends on the proportion of M-users in her own group. This implies that  the contracep- 
tive prevalence in each group evolves independently, although the each woman randomly 
samples from both groups. This property arises because women tend to attribute group 
differences in the sample composition to the observed characteristics rather than to the 
differential effectiveness p of the methods. The respective asymptotic properties derived 
in the previous section hold for each of the groups individually, and the two limiting shares 
are independent of each other. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from above argument: First, if groups differ in 
observable characteristics then above information diffusion process does not induce corre- 
lation in the contraceptive prevalence, even if network partners are randomly drawn from 
both groups. This model is consistent with regional diversity in contraceptive practices, 
and with variation of demographic behavior across different social s trata even in the pres- 
ence of comnlunication across social barriers. Second, for a family planning program that 
relies on diffusion of knowledge for the long term prevalence of a contraceptive M it is 
crucial that  the initial contracepting population contains M-users in both groups. It is 
not sufficient to convince members of one religious group of a modern contraceptive and 
hope that by diffusion the other religious group will adopt the method as well. Above 
argument shows that this is not the case if religion is an observable characteristic and 
people anticipate that this characteristic has an  effect on the adoption of a contraceptive 
method. 
5 A REVEALED UTILITY MODEL 
5 A Revealed Utility Model 
The previous sections assumed that informal conversations among community members 
are incomplete: word-of-mouth communication does not inform about the exact utility 
level of other contraceptive users, and it does not reveal completely the heterogeneity in 
the population. The 1973 Korean survey indicates that the women's decision process in 
this situation is approximately replicated by a qualitative choice model in which women 
optimally infer the differential effectiveness of the contraceptive methods from the limited 
sample information. 
For the coinpleteness of the analysis this final section investigates a revealed utility 
model as alternative assumption on women's interactions. The model in this section sup- 
poses that the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge is based on an intensive com~~lunication 
of community members. Recall that the utility a woinan achieves using method i is given 
by U, = p; + E; + v;, i = M ,  T. Intensively interacting woinen exchange not only their 
contraceptive choices, but also the experienced utility and all relevant private informa- 
tion. The conversation among network partners hence reveals the implemented method 
i = M ,  T, the utility level U;, and the individual characteristics E of all network part- 
ners. Since I / ; ,  i = M , T  are i.i.d., the conversation with one neighbor specifies a 'noisy' 
observation fi, of the meail effectiveness pi for the inethod i used by this neighbor. In 
particular, @, N N(pi ,  ;a2) where ;a2 = var(v,). Fro111 a sample of size li' containing m 
users of method M a woman can calculate the sample means of fi; for i = M , T .  Let ji, 
denote these sample means. A woman then chooses M if the expected utility of using M 
exceeds the excepted utility of using T, that is, if j i ~  - j i ~  + E > 0. The probability of a 
randomly selected woinan choosing M basetl on this sainple is 
A sainple containing only users of one method does not reveal any information about 
the relative effectiveness; however, it is reasonable to assuine that in this case a woman 
adopts the inethod contained in her sainple. This assllillption together equations 11 and 3 
specifies the urn function for the dynainic analysis of the revealed preference model. 
In the long terill the proportion of M users in the contracepting population X,, will 
converge to the set of fixed points of the urn fi~nction q(z ) .  Figure G shows the urn function 
G CONCLUSIONS 23 
for the earlier example with p = 0.253 and a2 = 1. These parameters imply a 'socially 
optimal' outcome for X,, of 0.6. If the sample size is large enough, women obtain very close 
estimates of the true pi by asking acquaintances. It is therefore not surprising that the 
only possible limit point of q(x) for large K is a single downcrossing close to the optimal 
outcome of 0.6. For small K additional possible limit points a t  x = 0 and x = 1 emerge. 
This model assumes intense communication among the members of a information net- 
work. Women not only have to disclose their choices, but also must reveal their u t q t y  
and their (not observable) individual characteristic 6 .  Under these strong conditions suffi- 
ciently large sample sizes imply one unique limit for contraceptive prevalence that is close 
to the socially efficient outcome. This argument suggests that an improvement of the in- 
formation content that  is transmitted in social networks is an alternative to an increased 
number of initial users to ensure long-term efficiency of information diffusion. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge through word-of-mouth 
communication as an  example for 'learning in informal networks.' It  is argued that 
women's conversations about fertility control are 'incomplete': communications inform 
only partially about a method's performance, and they give rise to unobserved heterogene- 
ity among network partners. In this context the dynamic implications of social learning 
depend on the behavioral assumptions about contraceptive decisions. These assumptions 
are reflected in the decision rules that link a woman's contraceptive choice to her personal 
characteristics and the inforination she obtained through network partners. 
An analysis of the 1973 Korean survey on women's social networks suggests that the 
proportion of pill-users among friends is a good predictor for a woman's probability to 
adopt the pill. The theoretical section develops three decision rules that are compared 
to this empirical finding. The majority rule assumes that woinen do not consider private 
information in their contraceptive decisions ant1 simply adopt the most popular alternative 
among their friends. This rule leads to a 'snowbdl' effect in which one method rapidly 
emerges as the dominant contraceptive in the population. However, the majority model 
is not consistent with the micro-evidence in the Korean data,  nor with long-term het- 
erogeneity alllong regions. The empirical 'invalitlitlity' of this model in combination with 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
the subsequent analyses shows that the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge may not be 
pervasive, even when the newly introduced method is indeed superior. 
The paper proposed as an alternative specification a qualitative choice rule. In this rule 
women infer the differential effectiveness of the contraceptive methods from their network 
information, and combine this inference optimally with their personal characteristics. This 
model predicts the pattern observed in the Korean data. The model is also consistent with 
a prevailing heterogeneity in contraceptive practices among regions or villages, and with 
a co-existence of methods within the same network. The long-term implications of this 
rule for the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge are robust against small modifications 
such as the introduction of observed heterogeneity, or random sizes of social networks. 
For the design of fanlily planning programs this section suggests that the initial size of 
users is more important for a successful diffusion than the size of each woman's social 
network. The independent evolution of contraceptive use across observable characteristics 
emphasizes the necessity to establish an 'initial base' of contraceptive users in all social 
groups. 
A final section illustrates the implications when women communicate their experienced 
utility level and all personal characteristics. This revealed utility model shows that with 
'complete' communication the long term outcome of social learning is close to the social 
optimum. Improvements in the information content of women's conversations are therefore 
an alternative to ensure long-term social efficiency in information diffusion. 
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Table 1: Extent and content of social networking about fertility control 
I average number of neiglrbors I 
who are perceived to use 
Loop Pill Condom or 
vasectomy 
all women ( 2 . 6 1  2.27 1.82 
umc-women using 
Pill 
Condom or 2.90 4.49 
Vasectomy 
Notes :  T h e  actual survey used the  categories 'don't 
know any', 'know 1-2 women', '3-4 women', '5-6 
women', and  'more than 7 women'. These categor- 
ical responses were converted into numeric values 
by taking the  mean of the  first four categories, and 
eight women for the open ended category. 
Table 2: umc-women grouped by the proportion of pill users among umc-friends 
amone, umc-friends I of umc-women umc-women umc-friends amone. 
(1) 
proportion of pill users 
- 
(group mean in parenthesis ) 
0 t o  0.04 (0.0) 
0.05 to 0.2 (0.15) 
0.2 t o  0.34 (0.303) 
0.35 to 0.49 (0.415) 
0.5 t o  0.64 (0.537) 
0.65 t o  0.94 (0.76) 
(2) (3) (4 1 (5) 
number of proportion of average number of 
0.95 t o  1 (1.0) 
Notes :  umc-women: 268 worr 
- 
in group pill-users non-pill-users 
93 0.129 3.2 6.4 
15 0.133 8.0 10.6 
5 7 0.351 17.7 15.3 
37 0.432 16.3 14.8 
32 0.406 10.3 10.8 
10 0.70 6.6 7.2 
24 0.667 3.6 4.6 
en living in 25 rural  villages using modern contraception a t  
t ime of the  snrvey; ulnc-friends: friends and neighbors who are  perceived to use modern 
contraception by the  decision maker. 
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Table 3: Logit regressions for the 268 umc-women for the dependent variable women uses 
the Model 1: Logit regression. Model 2: Maximum likelihood estimation based on 
equation 1. 
I Parameter I 1 
(constant) PO 
age of woman PI 
number of living children 
excess fertility 
education: a t tended a t  PI 
least elementary scltool 
(parameter  of T)  
( ~ a r a m e t e r  of T) 
m 
~7 (proportion of pill users 7 
among umc-friends) 
In (Log of ratio pill-users to  7 
non-pill users among umc-friends) 
2.4720** - 
(0.5840) 
- 0.9598** 
(0.3531) 
pill, condom, vasectomy) and know a t  least one unlc-friend. Excess fertility is the  
difference between the  number of living children and Iler desired number of children 
as s ta ted  in the  survey. (b )  Standard errors are  given in parenthesis, and p-values 
a re  indicated as: * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. (c) T h e  dummies for villages 15 and 17 
could not be  estimated because wolllen in these villages used only one contraceptive 
method. T h e  25, 50, and  75 percentile for the village dummies are 0.698, 1.28, 1.97 
respectively, and  6 ou t  of 22 du~nrnies  are  significant a t  the 5 percent level. 
village dummies  not - 
reportedC 
Notes: (a)  T h e  regression includes 268 women who use modern contraception (loop, 
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Table 4: Majority rule model and qualitative choice model: probability of dominance by 
one method for yo = 10 and Xo = 0.6 
number of 
decisions 
n = 10 
t~ = 20 
t~ = 40 
t~ = 80 
Majority rule I Qualitative choice rule 
Probability of more than 80% of women using 
method T method M 
0 0 
0 0.741 
0.015 0.89 
0.03 1 0.93 
method T method M 
0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.022 
0.0 0.046 
0.001 0.064 
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Figure 
0 
7 
Figure 2: Majority based decisions: q(x) for various values of I T  and cr 
-q(x): K = 7 . 
alpha = 0.9 
I - -  q(x): K = 1 . alpha = 0.9 I - - - - -  - q(x): K = 1 . alpha = 0.1 l -  q(x): K = 7 , alpha = 0.1 
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Figure 3: Histogram of the proportion of pill-users in 25 Korean villages 
Figure 4: Probability distribution for the proportion of M users after 10 to 200 decisions 
number of 
adoptions n 
for X n  
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Figure 5: Limiting beta distribution of X,. ( X o  = 0.6, yo = 10 or 100, sampling is with 
replacement ) 
Figure 6: Urn function for revealed utility model 
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